

Message Text

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ACTION MBFR-03

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 IO-12 ADP-00 OIC-04 AEC-11 AECE-00

ACDA-19 OMB-01 TRSE-00 CIAE-00 PM-09 INR-10 L-03

NEA-10 NSAE-00 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 GAC-01 USIA-12

SAJ-01 H-02 NSC-10 SS-15 RSR-01 /155 W
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P R 051826 Z MAY 73

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8702

INFO SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

MBFR CAPITALS 389

USMISSION GENEVA

USNMR SHAPE

USLOSACLANT

USCINCEUR

USDOCOSOUTH

USDEL SALT TWO II

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 VIENNA 3686

GENEVA FOR DISTO

FROM US REP MBFR

E. O. 11652 GDS

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: MBFR: AD HOC GROUP MEETING, 4 MAY 1973

REF: VIENNA 3553

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: FOLLOWING ANNOUNCEMENT OF SOVIET REQUEST FOR MEETING WITH US AND NETHERLANDS REP LATER SAME DAY, MAY 4 MEETING OF AD HOC GROUP FOCUSED COMPLETELY ON ALLIED POSITION VIS A VIS CARRY- OVER. UK REP INSISTED HIS LATEST INSTRUCTIONS WERE FIRM NOT TO ACCEPT PROPOSED COMPROMISE AND ARGUED EXTENSIVELY THAT
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NAC INSTRUCTIONS OF 27 APRIL DID NOT REQUIRE FORMAL EASTERN ACCEPTANCE IN PROCEDURES/ PARTICIPATION PACKAGE OF CARRY- OVER PRINCIPLE. ACTING ON BASIS OF APPROACH INITIALLY SUGGESTED BY FRG REP, AD HOC GROUP REQUESTED EMISSARIES TO TRY GAIN SOVIET

AGREEMENT THAT CARRY- OVER EXCHANGE INCLUDING SOVIET RESERVE ON INVITING OBSERVERS (TEXT PARA 12 REFTEL) BE HANDLED THROUGH WESTERN AND EASTERN ORAL STATEMENTS IN QUADRILATERAL FRAMEWORK INSTEAD OF INCORPORATED INTO WRITTEN RECORD OF PROCEDURES/ PARTICIPATION PACKAGE. END SUMMARY.

2. AFTER WELCOMING THE NEW LUXEMBOURG REP (AMBASSADOR DUEHR) TO AD HOC GROUP, CHAIRMAN (SEKERIS, GREECE) ANNOUNCED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD ASKED FOR A MEETING WITH THE US AND NETHERLANDS REPS. THE MEETING HAD BEEN SCHEDULED FOR 1600 THAT DAY. HE BELIEVED THAT THE URGENT TASK FOR THE GROUP WAS TO DISCUSS GUIDANCE FOR THE EMISSARIES RE CARRY- OVER. US REP REPORTED HIS AUTHORITIES HAD INSTRUCTED HIM THAT THEY WERE WILLING TO ACCEPT SOVIET PROPOSAL OF APRIL 30. CHAIRMAN AS GREEK REP SAID HE HAD RECEIVED SIMILAR WRITTEN INSTRUCTIONS FROM HIS AUTHORITIES. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE ENTIRE GROUP WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE UK HAD AGREED ON AN ADJUSTED VERSION OF THE SOVIET COMPROMISE PROPOSAL AND INVITED THE UK REP (THOMSON) TO TAKE THE FLOOR.

3. THOMSON BEGAN LENGTHY PRESENTATION BY NOTING THAT THE TALKS WERE MOVING INTO A CRITICAL PHASE, PARTICULARLY IN RELATION TO THE INCREASINGLY INTERRELATED CSCE AND MBFR TIMETABLES. HE REITERATED HIS PREVIOUS CAUTIONS TO THE GROUP THAT MBFR NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE LONG AND TOUGH AND THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD NOT BE IMPATIENT. HE ALSO REPEATED PAST BRITISH WARNINGS IN THE NAC THAT THE SOVIETS WERE PROCRASTINATING AND THAT WESTERN CONCESSIONS IN ORDER TO GAIN CARRY- OVER WOULD NOT NECESSARILY GUARANTEE AN EARLY END TO THE EXPLORATIONS. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE SOVIETS COULD SPIN OUT THE VIENNA TALKS UNTIL A DATE FOR THE FIRST PHASE OF CSCE IS ENSURED, CITING KVITSINSKIY' S REFERENCES TO LINKAGE. THOMSON THOUGHT, HOWEVER, THAT THERE WOULD BE A PERIOD OF TIME WHEN THE SOVIETS WOULD IN FACT BE THE DEMANDEURS. HE ESTIMATED ON A PERSONAL BASIS THAT THE CSCE PHASE I DATE WOULD BE SET AD REF DURING THE
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WEEK OF 21 MAY AND CONFIRMED BY SOMETIME DURING THE WEEK OF 6 JUNE. HE SPECULATED THAT IN THIS PERIOD OF TIME WESTERN LEVERAGE IN VIENNA WOULD BE GREATEST. HE SAID THAT THE EST SHOULD MAKE IT PLAIN TO THE SOVIETS THAT THEY COULD EXPECT NO FURTHER CONCESSIONS UNTIL THEY HAVE AGREED TO A DATE AND PLACE FOR THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS.

4. THOMSON THEN MOVED TO A DISCUSSION OF THE NAC' S 27 APRIL GUIDANCE TO THE AD HOC GROUP. HE OPINED THAT THERE WAS A MISUNDERSTANDING WITHIN THE GROUP AS TO WHETHER THE INSTRUCTIONS REQUIRED THAT THE EMISSARIES OBTAIN WRITTEN CONIRMAION OF SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF THE CARRY- OVER PRICIPLE. REFERRING TO ACCOUNTS OF PAST SESSIONS BETWEEN THE

EMISSARIES AND THE SOVIETS, THOMSON SAID THAT THE RECORD ALREADY SHOWED ADEQUATE SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF THE CARRY- OVER PRINCIPLE. HE ALSO REMINED THE GROUP THAT HIS AUTHORITIES HAD NEVER BEEN HAPPY ABOUT CARRY- OVER, AND HAD ACCEPTED THE CONCEPT ONLY WITH GREAT RELUCTANCE. HE THOUGHT THAT THE SOVIETS IN FACT HAD JUSTIFIABLE GROUNDS FOR CLAIMING THAT THE ALLIED DESIRE TO FORMALIZE CARRY- OVER WAS A NEW ELEMENT INVITING FURTHER SOVIET REQUIREMENTS. IN SUM, THOMSON SAID HIS AUTHORITIES THOUGHT THAT THE EMISSARIES HAD ALREADY OBTAINED WHAT WAS REQUIRED IN THE NAC GUIDANCE WITHOUT THE FORMAL CARRY- OVER EXCHANGE. HE ASKED OTHER REPS TO CHECK WITH THEIR CAPTIALS AND NATO DELEGATIONS TO HELP CLARIFY WHETHER OR NOT THE NAC GUIDANCE REQUIRED A WRITTEN CARRY- OVER PROVISION.

5. THE CHAIRMAN WHO HAD ALSO BEEN PRESENT AT THE NAC DISCUSSIONS, SAID THAT THE NAC DID NOT SPECIFY A WRITTEN OR ANY OTHER FORM FOR CARRY- OVER, BUT DID REQUIRE A CLEAR- CUT AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIETS ON THE POINT. THE US REP SAID IN REPLY TO THOMSON' S REMARKS THAT THE SOVIET COMMENTS TO DATE ON CARRY- OVER SHOULD IN NO WAY BE REGARDED AS ASSURANCES. THE SOVIET POSITION, AS IT HAD EVOLVED, REQUIRED TWO ADDITIONAL STEPS TO ACCOMPANY AGREEMENT ON CARRY- OVER; ORAL WESTERN ASSURANCE CONCERNING THE SOVIET RIGHT TO RAISE THE QUESTION OF WORKING GROUPS; AND AN EASTERN ASSERTION OF THEIR RIGHT TO RAISE THE QUESTION OF INVITING OBSERVERS TO THE NEGOTIATIONS. IF THESE CONDITIONS WERE NOT MET NOW, THEY WOULD HAVE TO BE MET LATER IN THE PRESENT
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TALKS AND MORE MIGHT BE ADDED. US REP REITERATED PAST WARNINGS CONCERNING THE DANGER OF LEAVING THE CARRY- OVER QUESTION UNSETTLED, INVITING THE SOVIETS TO TRY TO EXTRACT EVEN MORE CONCESSIONS WHEN THE ALLIES TRIED TO INCORPORATE THE CARRY- OVER CONCEPT IN THE COMMUNIQUE OR CRATING CHAOS AT OUTSET OF NEGOTIATIONS. AGREEMENT ON THE CURRENT COMPROMISE PROPOSAL COULD CLOSE THE DOOR TO ANY SUCH ATTEMPT. TH UK APPROACH, INSTEAD OF EXPEDITING THE CRRENT CONSULTATIONS, COULD GUARANTEE THEIR PROTRACTION. US REP ADDED THAT ALL THE GOVERNMENTS IN THE AD HOC GROUP HAVE BEEN CURRENTLY INFORMED OF STATUS OF DISUCSSIONS WITH EAST OVER CARRY- OVER, AND THERE IS NO QUESTION OF MISUNDERSTANDING AS THE UK REP HAD SUGGESTED.

6. THE NETHERLANDS DEP REP (DE VOS) AGREED WITH THE US REP. IT WAS HIS IMPRESSION THAT, ALTHOUGH THE HAC HAD NOT INTENDED TO HAVE THE EMISARIES GAIN WRITTEN ACCEPTANCE OF THE CLAUSE MAKING CARRY- OVER " SUBJECT TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A CHANGE IN THE STATUS OF HUNGARY", IT HAD INTENDED THAT CARRY- OVER ITSELF BE RECORDED AS CLEARLY AS POSSIBLE. THE CHAIRMAN EMPHASIZED THAT THE HAC GUIDANCE HAD BEEN INTENDED TO BE FLEXIBLE, LEAVING THE AD HOC GROUP GREAT

LATITUDE CONCERNING HOW TO OBTAIN CARRY- OVER. THE TURKISH

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ACTION MBFR-03

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 IO-12 ADP-00 OIC-04 AEC-11 AECE-00

ACDA-19 OMB-01 TRSE-00 CIAE-00 PM-09 INR-10 L-03

NEA-10 NSAE-00 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 GAC-01 USIA-12

SAJ-01 H-02 NSC-10 SS-15 RSR-01 /155 W

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P R 051826 Z MAY 73

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8703

MBFR CAPITALS 390

USMISSION GENEVA

USNMR SHAPE

USLOSACLANT

USCINCEUR

USDOCOSOUTH

USDEL SALT TWO II

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REP (TULUMEN) SAID THAT THERE WAS NO REASON TO GO BACK TO
AUTHORITIES , OR TO FURTHER INTERPRET THE NAC GUIDANCE.
EACH COUNTRY IN THE AD HOC GROUP HAD EXPRESSED ITS NATIONAL
POSITION ON THE QUESTION ALREADY.

7. THE FRG REP (RUTH) SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE
INTERPRETATION OF THE NAC GUIDANCE WAS IMPORTANT. HE
THOUGHT THAT THE GUIDANCE PERMITTED THE GROUP TO TAKE
ESSENTIALLY ONE OF THREE APPROACHES. FIRST, IF THE GROUP
CONSIDERED SUFFICIENT PAST SOVIET COMMENTS THAT THEY AGREED
WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF CARRY- OVER, THEN A FURTHER WRITTEN
ASSURANCE WAS NOT NECESSARY. AS A SECOND POSSIBILITY, THE
ALLIES COULD EXCHANGE ORAL STATEMENTS WITH THE SOVIETS IN
THE QUADRILATERAL FRAMEWORK ON THE SAME BASIS AS THE
ASSURANCE THE ALLIES HAD AGREED TO GIVE THE SOVIETS CONCERNING
THEIR RIGHT TO RAISE THE QUESTION OF WORKING GROUPS. AS A
THIRD ALTERNATIVE, THE ALLIES COULD GO FOR A WRITTEN

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EXCHANGE ON CARRY- OVER, THUS ALSO HAVING TO ACCEPT THE
WRITTEN SOVIET STATEMENT ON INVITING OBSERVERS. THE US REP

SAID THAT THE SECOND TWO CHOICES WERE THE ONLY REAL ONES, BECAUSE SOVIET STATEMENTS TO DATE DO NOT CONSTITUTE ASSURANCE RE CARRY-OVER. HE WARNED AGAIN OF THE DANGERS OF LEAVING THE CARRY-OVER QUESTION OPEN, INVITING THE SOVIETS TO REOPEN POINTS NOW SETTLED IN THE PROCEDURES/ PARTICIPATION PACKAGE. THE FRG REP ADDED THAT ONE QUESTION FOR THE GROUP TO CONSIDER WAS WHETHER THE ALLIED LEVERAGE WOULD INDEED BE GREATER IN A FEW WEEKS AS THE BRITISH REP HAD SUGGESTED. OR WHETHER THE PRICE THE SOVIETS WERE ASKING NOW IN THE FORM OF THEIR STATEMENT ON OBSERVERS WAS THE LEAST EXPENSIVE THE ALLIES COULD GET.

8. THE ITALIAN DEP REP (TALIANI) SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT STILL PREFERRED THAT CARRY-OVER BE RECORDED IN WRITING. HE ACCEPTED, HOWEVER, THAT THERE WAS SOME LATITUDE IN THE NAC GUIDANCE. HE SAID THAT IF IT WOULD HELP THE UK, HE MIGHT BE ABLE TO ACCEPT SOME PROCEDURE, SUCH AS THE SECOND POSSIBILITY SUGGESTED BY THE FRG REP, WHEREBY THE CARRY-OVER AND OBSERVER LANGUAGE WOULD BE WRITTEN DOWN BUT NOT PART OF THE PROCEDURES/ PARTICIPATION PACKAGE. THE UK REP SAID THAT HE THOUGHT HIS AUTHORITY MIGHT IN PRINCIPLE ACCEPT THIS GENERAL APPROACH SUGGESTED BY THE FRG REP AND SUPPORTED BY THE ITALIAN DEP REP.

9. THE CHAIRMAN, IN HIS NATIONAL CAPACITY, ASKED WHAT THE ADVANTAGE OF SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD BE. THE ALLIES WOULD HAVE A LESS VALID COMMITMENT TO CARRY-OVER, BUT THE SOVIETS WOULD STILL BE ABLE TO USE THEIR STATEMENT ON OBSERVERS FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES. THE UK REP RESPONDED THAT CARRY-OVER DOES NOT NEED BE RECONFIRMED BECAUSE IT ALREADY IS IMPLICIT IN THE CRUCIAL ELEMENTS OF THE PROCEDURES/ PARTICIPATION PACKAGE. HIS AUTHORITIES WERE THEREFORE NOT HAPPY ABOUT PAYING A PRICE FOR SOMETHING WHICH THEY DID NOT LIKE AND IN ANY CASE DID NOT CONSIDER NECESSARY. HE RECOGNIZED THAT THE SOVIETS WILL PLAY THE FINAL AGREEMENT THE WAY THEY WANT AND WE CAN'T STOP THEM FROM INCLUDING THEIR AUGMENTATION CONCERNING INVITING THE NEUTRALS AS OBSERVERS. BUT HE SAW NO REASON TO GIVE THEIR STATEMENT FORMAL STANDING IN THE PROCEDURES/ PARTICIPATION PACKAGE.

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10. THE UK REP THEN WENT ON TO SUGGEST THAT THE MISARRIES, WHEN THEY MET WITH THE SOVIETS COULD: ACCEPT THE PROCEDURES/ PARTICIPATION PACKAGE; RECALL SOVIET OPPOSITION TO INCLUSION OF A CARRY-OVER PARAGRAPH IN THE PROCEDURES PAPER; STATE THE ALLIED UNDERSTANDING THAT THE PROCEDURES WOULD BE CARRIED OVER, SUBJECT TO CHANGE BY CONSENSUS, ADDING THE ALLIED UNDERSTANDING THAT SOVIET DESIRES TO RAISE THE MATTER OF WORKING GROUPS COULD BE HANDLED WITHIN THIS FRAMEWORK; AND IF THE SOVIETS THEN RAISED THE QUESTION OF OBSERVERS, COULD SAY THAT THE SOVIETS COULD PUBLICIZE THEIR POSITION JUST AS THE ALLIES COULD PUBLICIZE THEIR POSITION ON CARRY-OVER.

THE UK REP THOUGHT THAT SOVIETS MIGHT GO ALONG WITH SUCH AN APPROACH. THE US AND GREEK REPS WERE SKEPTICAL. THE FRG REP REVIEWED THE MERITS AND DEMERITS OF THE POSSIBLE APPROACHES, COMING DOWN IN FAVOR OF SUGGESTING THE ORAL STATEMENT APPROACH WITH THE SOVIETS.

11. THE US REP SAID THAT IN SPITE OF MISGIVINGS AS TO THE PRACITCALITY OF THE SCHEME AND THE VALUE OF THE OUTCOME IF IT WERE ACCEPTED, IN THE INTEREST OF ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY HE WOULD BE WILLING TO TRY SUCH AN APPROACH. THE TURKISH REP ADDED HIS MISGIVINGS ABOUT THE ORAL ROUTE, NOTING HIS CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR INCORPORATING CARRY- OVER IN THE PROCEDURES/ PARTICIPATION PACKAGE. THE ITALIAN DEP REP SAID HE WOULD ACCEPT A LESS FORMAL APPROACH AS LONG AS CARRY- OVER WERE REFLECTED IN SOME WRITTEN FORM AND THERE WAS NO MENTION CONNECTED WITH THE CARRY- OVER STATMENT OF CHANGING THE PROCEDURES/ PARTICIPATION ARRANGEMENTS BY CONSENSUS.

12. THE UK REP THEN NOTED THAT A CONSENSUS SEEMED TO BE POSSIBLE TO TRY FOR THREE ORAL STATMENTS. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE AD HOC GROUP TEXT REGARDING WORKING GROUPS BE THE FIRST STATEMENT. HE THEN BEGAN TO SUGGEST WORDING FOR THE CARRY- OVER AND OBSERVER PORTIONS. THE CAHIRMAN INTERRUPTED TO NOTE THAT THE LANGUAGE THE GRUOP HAD DEVELOPED FOR THE PROCEDURES/ PARTICIPATION PACKAGE COULD BE USED. HE URGED THE UK REP NOT TO TRY TO CHANGE THIS LANGUAGE WHICH HAD BEEN LABORIOUSLY AGREED IN THE GROUP. THE UK REP SAID THAT USING THE LANGUAGE WOULD GO DIRECTLY AGAINST HIS INTRUCTIONS. HE ASKED FOR A 15 MINUTE RECESS TO CONSIDER THE MATTER.

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ACTION MBFR-03

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 IO-12 ADP-00 OIC-04 AEC-11 AECE-00

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SAJ-01 H-02 NSC-10 SS-15 RSR-01 /155 W

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P R 051826 Z MAY 73

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8704

INFO SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

MBFR CAPITALS 391

USMISSION GENEVA

USNMR SHAPE

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USDOCOSOUTH
USDEL SALT TWO II

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13. THE BELGIAN DEP REP (WILLOT) SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT REQUIRED MORE ASSURANCE THAN THAT ALREADY GIVEN BY THE SOVIETS RE CARRY- OVER. HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD STILL PREFER WRITING THE CARRY- OVER. PROVISION INTO THE PROCEDURES/ PARTICIPATION PACKAGE, BUT HE SUGGESTED THAT UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS, SOMETHING LESS MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE. IN THIS REGARD, HE SAID THAT A SOVIET COMMITMENT NOT TO OPPOSE A CARRY- OVER PROVISION IN THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE WOULD BE DESIRABLE. HE THOUGHT THAT THE DYNAMICS OF THE MEETING WITH THE SOVIETS MIGHT VERY WELL LEAD TO AGREEMENT ON ORAL STATEMENTS. THEIR MAIN INTEREST WAS IN THE PROPAGANDA MILEAGE OF THE STATEMENT ON OBSERVERS. IN HIS DISCUSSIONS THE NIGHT BEFORE AT THE RECEPTION IN THE CZECH RESIDENCE, HE HAD FOUND THE EAST EUROPEANS DISINTERESTED IN SUCH A STATEMENT. HE THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD BE
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DIFFICULT TO GET THE SOVIETS TO REMOVE THE REFERENCE IN THEIR STATEMENT WHICH MAKES IT CLEAR THT IT IS THEIR DESIRE TO RAISE THE QUESTION OF INVITING OBSERVERSM THE ITALIAN DEP REP AGREED. THE CANADIAN REP (GRANDE) SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT SUPPORTED THE APPROACH THAT HAD BEEN AGREED BY ALL THE ALLIES BUT THE UK. HE INDICATED, HOWEVER, THAT HE PROBABLY COULD SUPPORT ANOTHER OUTCOME. THE DANISH REP (POULSON) INDICATED THAT HIS AUTHORITIES PROBABLY COULD SUPPORT THE ORAL STATEMENT APPROACH, BUT STRONGLY URGED STICKING TO THE TEXTS WORKED OUT IN THE GROUP. THE FRG MADE A STRONG PLEA TO THE BRITISH REP TO ALLOW USE OF THE TEXTS. THE GROUP THEN RECESSED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE BRITISH REQUEST.

14. WHEN THE GROUP RESUMED, THE UK REP REPORTED THAT STRICTLY ON AN AD REF AND PERSONAL BASIS HE WOULD SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING APPROACH: THE EMISSARIES COULD PROPOSE THAT THE THREE STATEMENTS-- ON WORKING GROUPS, CARRY- OVER, AND OBSERVERS-- BE DELIVERED ORALLY IN THE QUADRILATERAL FRAMEWORK AT DICTATION SPEED. NO DOCUMENTS WOULD BE PASSED BUT EITHER SIDE WOULD BE ABLE TO PUBLICIZE THE CONTENT OF THE PROCEEDINGS. HE WOULD PREFER THAT THE TWO ALLIED STATEMENTS BE LINKED TOGETHER PRESENTATIONALLY. HE WARNED THAT HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER HIS AUTHORITIES WOULD SUPPORT HIM AND HE AGAIN REQUESTED THE OTHERS TO REPORT BACK TO THEIR GOVERNMENTS THE BRITISH INTERPRETATION OF THE NAC GUIDANCE ON CARRY- OVER.

15. THE GROUP AGREED THAT THIS COULD BE PROPOSED TO THE SOVIETS. VARIOUS REPS, HOWEVER, ADDED CERTAIN QUALIFICATIONS. THE ITALIAN

DEP REP NOTED THAT THERE SHOULD BE CLEAR AGREEMENT THAT THE STATEMENTS COULD BE PUBLICIZED. THE FRG REP SAID THAT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO BE ABLE TO SAY THAT THE THREE STATEMENTS CONSTITUTED AN AGREEMENT OF THE QUADRIPARTITE GROUP. HE ADDED THAT THE EXCHANGE WOULD HAVE TO TAKE PLACE BEFORE THE FIRST PLENARY. THERE WERE NO OBJECTIONS TO THESE CONDITIONS, BUT THE TURKISH REP REPEATED THAT HE HAD STRONG INSTRUCTIONS FAVORING INCORPORATING CARRY- OVER IN THE WRITTEN PROCEDURES/ PARTICIPATION PACKAGE.

16. THE CHAIRMAN ADJOURNED THE MEETING, SCHEDULING THE NEXT SESSION FOR 5 MAY AT 1030 HOURS TO HEAR THE RESULTS OF THE CONTACT WITH THE SOVIETS. HUMES

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GENEVA
USNMR SHAPE
USLOSACLANT
USCINCEUR
USDOCOSOUTH

SALT TWO II

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